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In May of 1997 I spoke at a conference organised by the Geography 
Department of the University of Reading. The conference was given the 
provocative - but in retrospect, alas, rather presumptuous - title: 'After 
Globalisation'. Rumours of its demise were, as the saying goes, somewhat 
exaggerated. But with the indulgence of hindsight encouraged by this issue's 
theme, we can recognise a broader cultural and intellectual assumption at 
work. Globalisation was, indeed, the buzz-word of the 1990s, just as 
postmodernism was the intellectual vogue of the 1980s, and so it seemed 
not unreasonable to speculate, as the decade advanced, on what would follow. 
And however banal the historical assumptions involved, there is a dimension 
of cultural reality that corresponds to this sort of periodisation. 
Academic publishing, for example, tracked the trajectory of the concept 
from its early stirrings - not much really before Mike Featherstone's collection 
Global Culture and Anthony Giddens's Consequences of Modernity both in 1990 
- through a boom period in the mid-to-late decade - let's just take Manuel 
Castells's three volumes The Information Age (1996,1997, 1998) as the example 
- to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's neo-Marxist intervention Empire 
(2000) seeming to some to mark a degree of critical 'closure' at the decade's 
end.1 Commissioning editors are skilled at riding a wave, and it seemed at 
one point that the word 'globalisation' in a title was both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for the acceptance of a manuscript. But editors are also 
restless cultural entrepreneurs, constantly scanning the horizon for the next 
undulation to build and gather momentum. Like any other commodity, the 
literature of globalisation has its shelf-life. 
Well, this is no doubt a rather shallow indicator of the cultural impact of 
globalisation. It does scant justice to the complex processes that intellectuals 
were beginning to perceive and conceptually to shape during the nineties. 
Nevertheless, academic publishing, as an aspect of the culture industry of 
our time, is an integral part of the globalisation process, and the wave-like 
rhythm of this mediatisation is something to which I will return. Indeed, I 
will suggest that the reflexive relationship between the 'substance' of 
globalisation and its mediatisation deserves our particular attention. This 
discussion will be the last of three approaches by which I will attempt to 
understand at least some aspects of the agenda that was established under 
the heading of globalisation in the final decade of the twentieth century. 
1 EVENT, PROCESS, PERIOD 
Unlike postmodernism, globalisation theory was, in essence, a direct 
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conceptual response to events. The iconoclasm of postmodern theory lay 
in its preoccupation with epistemological and ontological meta-propositions 
and its suspicion of the historical grand narrative. At heart, then, in its 
'anti-foundationalism', it consisted of a set of self-denying ordinances. Subtle 
- even obsessively so - in its interrogation of discursive strategies, decisive 
in its critique of some of the more complacent attitudes ofwestern modernity, 
postmodern theory was actually rather poor at describing contemporary 
social and cultural reality. Who now can point - except, perhaps, for one or 
two idiosyncratic buildings - to any convincing examples of postmodern 
cultural artefacts, events or experiences? 
By contrast, globalisation theory - relatively indifferent to the scruples 
over subjectivity, discursive position, and the status of description that 
haunted postmodernism - was a much more robust, even rough and ready, 
project. Not that it failed to develop its own meta-theories: time-space 
distanciation, the structured articulation of the particular with the universal, 
the network society.2 Nor did it lack iconoclasm: in its implications for the 
tacit equation between society and nation-state, or in the challenge of cultural 
hybridity to conventional notions of cultural boundaries, for obvious 
examples. But it was probably never either self-consciously theoretically 
ambitious nor deliberately bent on pulling the rug from under established 
positions. Globalisation theory simply confronted the rather obvious 
inadequacy - once you came to think about it - of some key intellectual 
assumptions about a social, economic and cultural world that was rapidly 
revealing its complicated and dynamic interconnectedness. 
Another way of putting this is to say that it is the empirical reality - as 
focused in certain emblematic events - which is the most interesting aspect 
of globalisation. If the theory of globalisation has been largely inductive, or 
else parasitic on other debates - most notably the debate over modernity -
this is understandable. The events themselves have been driving the process, 
and theorists, chastened (perhaps with the exception of Hardt and Negri) 
by the failures of previous theoretical edifice building, have been in a 
responsive mode, feeling their way. 
What may be interesting, then, is to explore the relationship of key 
'globalisation events' to interpretations of the globalisation process within 
the period of the 1990s. This is not to pose the question of why (or whether) 
the nineties were the 'decade of globalisation'. (Though what this might 
mean beyond the historically banal game of decade labelling is something 
I will return to.) Rather, it is to try to tease out from within this artificial -
though not arbitrary - time-frame, something of the way in which underlying 
dynamics of globalisation have been inferred from the interpretation of 
complex events. 
Rather than being bound, slavishly, by precise calendrical detail, we can 
take as co-ordinates two events which lie just outside the nineties themselves: 
the fall of the Berlin wall and the associated collapse of the majority of the 
Eastern Bloc communist regimes in 1989, and the attack on the World Trade 
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Centre in New York in 2001. Let us say, so as not to seem too perverse in 
this choice, that these events roughly 'frame' the decade. 
Both events were of course immense collapses: both real and symbolic 
capitulations of the historical givens of the twentieth century to huge, 
apparently unpredictable and irresistible forces. And to forces which, 
moreover, fanned out from their initial impact into further chains of events. 
How were these forces to be interpreted as the forces of globalisation? 
There seem to me to be two main contending trajectories of 
interpretation involved. The first invokes a robust logic of global capitalist 
expansion. The second traces a rather more obscure dynamic of modernity 
attaching to the linked notions of spatial compression, social and 
technological mobility and deterritorialisation, and a consequent 
intensification of struggles over cultural identity. 
According to the first interpretation, the collapse of communism was a 
reaction to a step change in the global advance of capitalism. The increasing 
power and integration of the global capitalist market made it impossible 
for the control economies of the Eastern bloc to survive outside of this 
indisputably dominant world system. The capitulation of these political 
regimes - in the most extraordinary wave of depositions: Hungary, Poland, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania - was, of course, most 
immediately due to internal pressures for liberalisation across both the 
polit ical and the economic spheres. But the impetus towards this 
undoubtedly lay in a combination of the external economic forces which 
were rapidly undermining the economic bases of these countries, and the 
demonstration, via a globalising media, of the attractions of western 
consumer culture ineluctably associated with both capitalism and democratic 
liberalism. Traced back, then, the heroic popular politics of this year of 
revolutions revealed structural sources, which rather ironically, confirmed 
the Marxian thesis of economic determination 'in the final instance'. The 
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the mass 
privatisation of state-run industry in Russia that followed, seemed to confirm 
this interpretation. And the case of China was no real exception. True, 
Tiananmen in 1989 had demonstrated that this regime's massive 
bureaucratic and military bulk was not so easily to be toppled. But the rapid 
economic liberalisation that followed in China throughout the nineties 
confirmed - not least in the official epithets that sanctioned the introduction 
of the free market, the 'Open-Door Policy' and 'Chinese Characteristic 
Socialism' - the de facto triumph even here of globalised capitalism. 
None of these examples, of course, lend unambiguous support for the 
benefits of the capitalist way. But this was never the key issue, and the subsidiary 
thesis of the 'uneven impact' of the spread of globalising capitalism could 
account for the contrast between, say, the disastrous instabilities of Russian 
capitalism and the (thus far) relatively controlled transition of China. The 
point is that, for good or i l l , it was the globalisation of capitalism that was 
judged, on this interpretation, the overwhelming transformative force. The 
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vulnerability of even well-established capitalist economies like that of the 
U K to 'massive turbulence on the international currency markets' - to quote 
Chancellor Norman Lamont's resonant description of 'Black Wednesday' 
1994 - seemed to confirm that the only globalisation that really counts is 
economic globalisation. 
And this view was, pretty much, that of the 'anti-globalisation movement' 
which emerged in the mid-decade and helped to define the phenomenon 
in the media's imagination. What gave form to this diverse collection of 
eco-political, human rights, anti-corporate, developmental and other 
activists was, particularly, the focus on opposition to the establishment of 
the World Trade Organisation in 1995. The famous anti-globalisation 
protests of the late nineties - set-piece media events staged against W T O , 
G8 and other summits in Seattle, Prague, Genoa and elsewhere - seemed to 
connect seamlessly with the May-day anti-capitalist demonstrations in 
financial centres like London. Globalisation as a force to be resisted became 
indistinguishable from global corporate capitalism. 
However, even as these different events were unfolding, this forceful 
one-dimensional story began to show signs of inadequacy. The repercussions 
of the fall of Eastern European communism, most obvious in the former 
Yugoslavia, clearly demonstrated that forces other than global capitalism 
were in play. The bloody conflicts in Croatia (1991-2), Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1992-5) and Kosova (1998-9) could not, even on the narrowest of 
interpretations, be judged as the fall-out from an exclusively political-
economic process. What the 'opening up' of globalisation meant in this 
context was the unleashing of violent cultural forces - ethnic/nationalist 
factionalism - which had been, apparently, artificially contained under the 
communist federal regime. The rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav 
Federation revealed deep divisions in cultural and religious identities - Serbs, 
Croats, Bosnians, ethnic Albanians, Christians and Muslims - which became 
inflamed into what Mary Kaldor has aptly called the 'new wars' of the era of 
globalisation. 
These new conflicts - what Kaldor describes as 'a mixture of war, crime 
and human rights violations'3 - are to be distinguished from the 'old wars' 
which modern nation-states periodically fight over territorial, geopolitical 
and economic goals. Kaldor's analysis relates 'new wars' to the process of 
globalisation in a number of ways. For example, they occur in the context of 
the erosion of nation-state structures and the monopoly of legitimate violence 
associated with them; they involve a whole range of international agencies 
beyond the contending parties - from the U N and a range of NGOs to 
mercenary troops, military advisers and the international media. But most 
significantly, these 'globalisation wars' are fought around a vicious, 
particularistic form of 'identity politics' in which, 'movements ... mobilize 
around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state 
power'.4 
The assertion of, and the struggle over, cultural identity, then, is at the 
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core of the second dynamic of globalising modernity. The world at the end 
of the second millennium seemed, on this view, much less one of uniform 
capitalist ascendancy than of 'pressed-together dissimilarities variously 
arranged'.5 This trajectory of interpretation gathers in a different catalogue 
of events: most particularly the rise of Islam on the international agenda. 
From the Gulf War, through the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to 
the Muslim-Christian dimension of the war in Kosova, the so-called cultural 
clash between the Islamic and Western 'worlds' became a familiar backdrop 
to events. Within this context, the seemingly 'anti-modern' proclivities of 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan also attracted sporadic attention: their 
illiberal and regressive policies towards women, the banning of various forms 
of media and communications technologies, the destruction, on apparently 
fundamentalist-dogmatic grounds, of the 'world treasure' of the Buddhas 
of Bamiyan. And there was, from time to time, a passing reference to Osama 
Bin Laden and the A l Quaida network. 
The shock of September 11, then, might be understood as the result of 
an underestimation of this second dynamic of globalising modernity - the 
(literally) explosive power of identity politics. O f course there is some 
plausibility in an interpretation of the attack in terms of the symbolic 
equation between America and global capitalism: the actual target was, after 
all, the World Trade Centre. But what wrong-footed the anti-globalisation 
movement - what made it impossible for them to regard this as instructive 
-was something apart from the sheer, awful, scale of the destructive violence. 
It was the inescapable association of the perpetrators with an ideology that, 
though it may have been (spectacularly) anti-capitalist, was in no other way 
compatible with the liberal, universalising tendency of the broad spectrum 
of anti-globalisationists. The globalisation that Al Quaida was pledged to 
destroy, it rather uncomfortably emerged, was not the neatly delineated 
institutional framework of the capitalist market: indeed, its resources were, 
apparently, dependent on financial dealings within this very market. The 
attack - no way to dodge the issue - was aimed at a cultural totality which 
included a whole cluster of liberal, secular practices and values close to the 
core of the western-modern imagination. Here was one universalism - one 
story of the right, the good, the one way to live - violently asserting itself 
against another. 
The western - let us be precise, the American - response to this was a 
predictably crude reassertion of its military-technological superiority which 
effortlessly, with ridiculously disproportionate force, flattened the Taliban 
regime, but which failed entirely to address, let alone find a resolution to, 
the underlying cultural issues. And to say that these are fundamentally 
cultural issues is not to endorse anything like Samuel Huntington's Clash of 
Civilizations (1996).6 Clearly the sources of anti-Western and anti-American 
sentiment that exist in many parts of the world - and not just the Islamic 
world - have to be understood in terms of the material - the political and 
economic - inequalities of globalisation. That is, of the experience of life 
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lived as one of the 'globalisation losers' in actual or mediated proximity 
with - and sharply aware of lines of culpability traceable to - the 'globalisation 
winners'. But the point is that such sentiments tend to be framed within 
complex life narratives which also constitute cultural identities. 
The young Muslim men who are schooled in a particular, narrow 
interpretation of Islam in the religious schools of Afghanistan or Pakistan, 
or who are growing up to see the West as their enemy in the siege territories 
of Gaza and the West Bank, are not somehow essentially fundamentalist in 
their makeup. Their beliefs are not inexplicable cultural anachronisms -
bizarre survivals of medievalism in a modern world. They are intelligible in 
terms of a certain - I would argue entirely global-modern - experience of 
that world framed within a powerful story of belonging. So we surely need 
to ask questions about the context of everyday life - its miseries, its injustices 
- that makes such a worldview so compelling and so dangerous. And , 
moreover, if we are to understand this, we have to struggle against our own 
assured, taken-for-granted worldviews: the sort of Western universalism that 
cannot conceive of the possibility that large sections of the world - whilst 
being entirely rational - fail to share our secular vision of the good life of 
liberal-individualist capitalist consumption. 
One dimension of globalisation, then, that deserves attention is its 
relationship with the generation and, as I shall argue in the following section, 
the proliferation of cultural identities, and the expression of these identities 
in terms of contending universalisms. 
2 MOVEMENT, IDENTITY, UNIVERSAL 
It is fair to say that the impact of globalisation in the cultural sphere has, 
most generally, been associated with the loss of identity. This view tends to 
interpret globalisation as a seamless extension o f - indeed as a euphemism 
for - western cultural imperialism. Globalisation, so this story goes, has 
swept like a flood tide through the world's manifold and discrete cultures, 
destroying stable localities, displacing peoples, bringing a market-driven, 
'branded' homogenisation of cultural experience, thus obliterating the 
differences between locality-defined cultures which had constituted our 
identities. 
Without rehearsing all the problems with this position,7 it is worth noting 
the implicit conception of 'cultural identity' - a vexed notion to begin with 
- that it entails. Cultural identity, when conceived as something that is fragile 
and vulnerable to social and economic forces - that requires policies of 
'protection' - appears as a peculiarly reified entity. Identity under this 
description is something a community enjoys as a sort of undisturbed 
existential possession, an inheritance, a benefit of traditional long dwelling, 
of continuity with the past. It is conceived of less as an actively constructed 
relationship of belonging than as a sort of collective treasure of local 
communities. 
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T h i s view o f identity as possession rather than process - and the cultural 
protect ionist pol ic ies it has underwr i t ten - have o f course been pretty 
thoroughly interrogated i n the crit ical literature o n cultural imperial ism. 
But what is interesting is how these assumptions have tended to colour the 
reception o f the idea o f globalisation, leading to the broadly distributed 
o p i n i o n - as m u c h amongst some sections o f the academy as amongst anti-
globalisation activists - that globalisation must always be simply destructive 
o f identities. T h e deterr i torial is ing character o f the globalisation process -
its property o f d imin i sh ing the significance o f actual geographical location 
to the mundane flow o f cultural experience8 - often tends to be seen as a 
'loss' o f a possession, rather than as a transformation i n the mode of cultural 
e x p e r i e n c e . A n d f r o m he re , the f a m i l i a r i m p l i c a t i o n s o f c u l t u r a l 
homogenisat ion, Amer icanisa t ion ' and so on seem naturally to follow. 
However, there is quite a contrary, and rather more interesting, available 
interpretation o f the impact o f globalisation: that, far from destroying it, 
globalisat ion has been perhaps the most significant force i n creating and 
proliferating cultural identity. 9 
T h i s interpretation hangs o n the (relatively uncontroversial) premise 
that globalisat ion is the globalisation not just o f capitalism, but o f a social-
economic-poli t ical-cul tural complex that we can call modernity. Modern i ty 
is a complex a n d contested idea, but at a certain level o f generalisation it 
can be unders tood as involving the abstraction o f social and cultural practices 
from contexts o f local particularity, and their institutionalisation and regulation 
across t ime a n d space.10 It is here, o f course, that its affinity w i th the 
globalisat ion process is most evident. 
T h e most r emarked examples o f such ins t i tu t iona l i sa t ion are the 
organisation a n d p o l i c i n g o f social territory (most obviously i n the nation-
state), or o f p roduc t ion a n d consumpt ion practices (industrialisation, the 
capitalist economy). Bu t modern i ty also institutionalises and regulates 
cul tura l practices, i n c l u d i n g those by w h i c h we imagine our existential 
condi t ion , our personal relations, and our attachment and be longing to a 
place or a community. T h e mode o f such imaginat ion it promotes is captured 
i n the no t ion o f 'cultural identity' - a p r ime example i f ever there was one 
o f the re f l ex ive i n t e r cou r se be tween soc ia l - sc ien t i f i c a n d everyday 
vocabularies. T h e essentially mode rn , 'organisational ' category o f cultural 
identity, then, consists i n self a n d c o m m u n a l defini t ions based a round 
specific, usually politically-inflected, differentiations: gender, sexuality, class, 
re l ig ion , race a n d ethnicity, nationality. Some of these differentiations o f 
course existed before the c o m i n g o f modernity, some - like nationality - are 
specifically m o d e r n imaginings. However, moderni ty has its impact not so 
m u c h i n the nature a n d substance o f these differentiations, as in the very fact 
of their institutionalisation and regulation. M o d e r n societies orchestrate 
existential experience according to wel l -pol iced boundaries. We 'live' our 
gender, our sexuality, our nationality and so forth within institutional regimes 
o f d i s c u r s i v e l y - o r g a n i s e d b e l o n g i n g s . W h a t c o u l d be a m u c h more 
i 
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amorphous, contingent, particular and tacit sense of belonging becomes 
structured into an array - a portfolio - of identities, each with implications 
for our material and psychological well-being, each, thus, with a 'polities'. 
Thus, as globalisation distributes the institutional features of modernity 
across all cultures, it produces 'identity' where none existed - where before 
there were perhaps more particular, more inchoate, less socially-policed 
belongings. One mistake of those who regard globalisation as a threat to 
cultural identity is, thus, to suppose this western-modern form of cultural 
imagination to be a universal feature of human experience. Al l cultures 
construct meaning via practices of collective symbolisation: this is universal. 
But not all cultures 'construct identity' in the institutional form that is now 
dominant in the modern West.11 Though most, as I shall presently argue, 
are coming to do so: this is the somewhat ironic homogenising force of 
globalisation. 
It is no simple coincidence, then, that the nineties were the decade not 
just of globalisation but of identity politics - for the two are intrinsically 
linked. One rather basic example of this linkage is in the constitution of the 
western-based anti-globalisation movement itself. As Shepard and Hayduk 
claim, the anti-WTO protestors in Seattle comprised 'a radical coalition of 
students, youth, feminists, environmental, labour, anarchist, queer and 
human rights activists'.12 It is pretty obvious - from the symbolic content of 
the trashing of McDonalds or Starbuck's outlets for example - that the 
protests were as much against the available, branded, gendered, identity 
positions of consumer capitalism as against global inequality or 
environmental damage. Accounts by activists, moreover, typically stress the 
'identity affirming' nature of these congregations oi'tribus'.n 
The other most obvious link between globalisation and identity politics, 
of course, can be seen in various projects of 're-territorialisation', in the 
claiming and reclaiming of localities. This can be seen, not just in the 
egregious examples of the ethnic conflicts over territory discussed earlier, 
but in less violent assertions of rights based around ethnic identity - for 
example, the land rights movements of aboriginal groups in Australia, the 
US and elsewhere. Of course, in such examples the claims of identity are 
inextricably mixed with issues of political and economic justice. And in some 
instances, notably in the famous case of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, 
it might be misleading to think of identity, rather than simple social justice, 
as being the defining issue.14 Nonetheless, the very notion of a juridical 
contestation of rights linked to identity - be this ethnic, gender, religious, 
sexual - seems understandable only within the sort of global-modern 
institutional form of identity which we have identified. 
Here we are returned to the issue of universalism which re-emerged 
with globalisation during the nineties, energetically surviving the wholesale 
theoretical assault of post-modernism. The contexts for this are various: 
political-ethical debates over 'global governance'; concerns over the 
conflicting claims of cultural sovereignty and human rights; the rise of 
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interest in cosmopolitanism.15 And, not least, the challenge from Islam of a 
robust competing universe of belief underpinning national societies - and 
clearly not dismissible, the Taliban aside, as a relic of pre-modernity. 
One, slightly oblique, way into these issues is to be found in Jacques 
Derrida's short essay 'On Forgiveness'. Within this essay, Derrida poses the 
question of how a cluster of quasi-religious concepts - forgiveness, 
repentance, confession, apology - belonging, he says, to the 'Abrahamic' 
t radi t ion, f ind a certain universal applicat ion in acts of public, 
institutionalised, 'theatrical' contrition. He asks: 
If ... such a language combines and accumulates powerful traditions 
within it ('Abrahamic' culture and that of a philosophical humanism, 
and more precisely a cosmopolitanism born from a graft of stoicism 
with Pauline Christianity), why does it impose itself on cultures which do 
not have European or 'biblical' origins? I am thinking of those scenes 
where a Japanese Prime Minister 'asked forgiveness' of the Koreans and 
the Chinese for past violence.16 
Part of his answer to this invokes the (rather awkward) neologism 
'Globalatinisation', 'to take into account the effect of Roman Christianity 
which today overdetermines all language of law, of politics, and even of 
what is called the "return of religion'" (p32). 
For Derrida, then, the juridical apparatuses of national and international 
tribunals - he cites particularly the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa - embody a universalising discourse in concepts like 'crimes 
against humanity' and 'universal human rights'. But like all universal claims, 
the ethic that informs the discourse is a particular one - in which the universal 
status of'humanity' derives from its 'sacredness' within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Derrida insists on the significance of this religious discourse (as 
against the secular rationalism of enlightenment modernity): 'No alleged 
disenchantment comes to interrupt it. O n the contrary' (p32). 
However true this may be, the more significant point here seems to me 
to be the institutionalising drive of globalisation. Whatever the composition, 
or the provenance, of the discourse of modern humanism, its deeply 
impressive international distribution - for the most part encompassing, 
rather than contesting, other universalisms - owes most to its institutional 
form. 'Humanity' - in its juridical form as an owner of rights or a victim -
is, in effect, a specific modern identity position which is universal by 
definition, but compatible with a huge range of cultural variation, by dint 
of its precise context of invocation: for instance in the International Court 
of Justice or other U N agencies. To be, without contradiction, 'human' in 
its rich pluralist acceptation, and 'human' in juridical-universalising terms 
is a trick brought off precisely by the institutionalised framing of repertoires 
of identity typical of modernity. In the midst of the proliferation of localisms 
and sharpened identity discriminations, globalisation also - formally, adroitly 
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- globalises universality. 
3 C O M M U N I C A T I O N , R H Y T H M , I M M E D I A C Y 
In this final section I want to bring together two themes which seem to have 
a connection, but one that is, to me at any rate, still quite obscure. These 
are the question of the precise role of media technologies in the globalisation 
process, and the intuition that globalisation seems intrinsically tied to an 
acceleration of events, or at least the experience of events. Globalisation's 
historical period, though much disputed, is probably at least co-extensive 
with that of modernity. Yet it seemed to gather pace, rather dramatically, 
during the nineties, and this suggests a connection with the rapid 
development and diffusion of 'accelerating' communication technologies 
at this time. 
To try to bring these issues into a little more focus, we can again draw on an 
insight from Derrida, though this time not one worked through in the form 
of an essay, but as a more spontaneous apercu occurring, and recurring, in 
the context of interviews. Derrida begins with a very simple observation 
about the unpredictability of events: 
[W]e had known since the 1950s what discredited and doomed the 
totalitarianism of Europe and the east to failure. This was the daily bread 
of my generation ... What remained unpredictable, was the rhythm, the 
speed, the date: for example, the date of the fall of the Berlin wall. In 
1987-8 no one in the world could have even an approximate idea of this 
date.17 
Of course, he says, it is always possible, after the fact, to detect causal factors 
and processes not evident at the time which make intelligible the 'rhythm' 
of the unfolding of events.18 And amongst these he singles out 'the 
geopolitical effect of telecommunications in general' (pi6). 
Derrida takes this idea up again in a later interview, and here he discusses 
the same and other examples - 'the Rabin-Arafat handshake, the end of 
apartheid in South Africa' - in terms of an intrinsic 'rhythm': 
For it is breaking, it is rolling up on itself like a wave, which accumulates 
strength and mass as it accelerates ... I think this acceleration in process 
is tied in an essential way and, in any case, to a large extent, to telematic, 
teletechnical transformation ... the crossing of borders by images, models 
etc. I believe that this technical transformation - of the telephone, of 
the fax machine, of television, email and the Internet - will have done 
more for what is called 'democratization' even in countries of the East, 
than all the discourses on behalf of human rights, more than all the 
17. Jacques Derrida, 
and B. Stiegler, 
Echographies of 
Television, 
Cambridge, Polity, 
2002, p l6 . 
18. In a wider 
theoretical 
application, Derrida 
says: 'Between the 
most general logics 
(the greatest 
predictability) and 
the most 
unpredictable 
singularities comes 
the intermediate 
schema of the 
rhythm'; Echographies 
of Television, ibid., 
pl6. 
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presentations of models in whose name this democratization was able to 
get started ... The acceleration of all political, or economic processes 
thus seems indissociable from a new temporality of technics, from another 
rhythmics (pp7l-2). 
19. See for instance 
S. Sassen, A Message 
from the Global 
South', Guardian, 12 
September 2001, 
P21. 
I very much like the idea of a wave breaking: of the culmination of a process 
- its gathering momentum, its accumulation of 'speed' - being a function 
of its telemediatisation. The physical metaphor is in every way to be preferred 
to the chemical one - telemediatisation as 'catalyst' - in which the media as 
a (re)agent exists as an element outside of the process itself. Of course, the 
metaphor is limited to certain orders of political-institutional process. It is 
less compelling when applied to the single, stark catastrophic event. Thus 
the quintessential example of'breaking news' - the event the phrase, flashing 
under the scenes of collapse of the W T C towers, seemed almost to be 
invented for - does not obviously conform to this, or any, rhythm. 
Nonetheless, September 11 can be understood - without in any way 
diminishing its awful material facticity - as in its essence a global 'media 
event': conceived, without doubt, in anticipation of its televisual 'impact'; 
duly, inevitably, presented in coverage dominated by the visual; interpreted 
by many commentators as the spectacular delivery of a 'message'.19 
Understood in this way, it conforms to some general features of the 
relationship between global-modern events and their representation and 
communication in which we can perhaps glimpse 'a new temporality of 
technics'. In conclusion, and very briefly, we can speculate on some of the 
emergent features of this temporality. 
Firstly, a feature of the connectivity of globalisation is quite clearly - so 
clear in fact as to be transparent, to escape examination - the convention of 
the immediate delivery of 'news'. This quintessentially modern cultural 
assumption, that 'the news' - indeed all sorts of communication - should be 
delivered as fast as possible, defines the trajectory of increasing acceleration 
in media technologies that Derrida mentions, and reaches back to the 
telegraph and onwards to current C M C convergences, particularly those 
linking mobile phones with the Internet and televisual communication. Add 
to these technological developments innovations in media institutions 
themselves - for instance 24-hour television or online news services - and 
we get a sense of a broader cultural principle which we could call 'immediacy'. 
And it doesn't stretch the imagination too much to extend this principle of 
'instant access' to include access to business, to consumption (for instance 
on-line shopping), to entertainment, or simply to each other (mobile phone 
chat as a defining feature of contemporary youth culture). Assemble all 
this, and we begin to see contemporary Western culture as dominated by a 
technology-driven obsession with speed, ubiquitous availability and instant 
gratification - along with decreasing attention spans, the so-called 'three 
minute culture' and so forth. 
Well, yes. But to conclude with a caution about binding immediacy too 
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closely to the (early) modern temporality of'speed'. It may be that in terms 
of, let us say, cultural sensibility, what we are witnessing in the emergence of 
immediacy is something quite new. Maybe not specifically a sensibility born 
in the nineties, but then, not that much in evidence before. For whereas 
'speed' seems to connote some of the informing values of industrial 
modernity, in particular the 'heroic' nature of machine power and human 
labour - of effort - in the overcoming of distance, immediacy grasps a much 
more insouciant attitude to technology, something of the lightness of what 
Zygmunt Bauman elegantly calls 'liquid modernity'.20 The technologies of 
communication with and through which we routinely interact create the 
impression of a general effortlessness and ubiquity of contact which seems to 
be distinct from the purposiveness of mechanically accomplished speed. It 
is as if the gap between departure and arrival, here and elsewhere, now and 
later, a certain order of desire and its fulfilment, has been closed by a 
technological legerdemain. As Paul Virilio observes, the transport revolution 
of the nineteenth century - the unimaginable speed of rail travel - reduced 
the significance of ajourney to two points: departure and arrival. By contrast, 
the coming of new communications technologies means that 'departure 
now gets wiped out and "arrival" gets promoted, the generalized arrival of 
data'.21 
A phenomenology of globalisation, then, ought to include analysis of 
this mediated lifeworld of which the sensibility of immediacy is a central 
feature. Such an analysis might reveal something beyond the implication of 
a general acceleration in interactions, or the closing of distance rather 
inadequately grasped in the idea of 'virtuality'. It might, for example, 
illuminate the eclipse of certain cultural values like patience or forbearance. 
It might make sense of the self-abolishing drive of televisual journalism 
towards 'immediate presence' and transparency. But most significantly, it 
might illuminate the profound penetration of mediated experience into 
everyday life, such that an imagined intimacy with distant others, under 
certain conditions of orchestration, becomes a commonplace. 
In one of the plethora of responses to September 11, Siavoj Zizek wrote: 
'When, after the bombings, even the Taliban foreign minister said that he 
can "feel the pain" of the American children, did he not thereby confirm 
the hegemonic ideological role of this, Bill Clinton's trademark phrase?'22 
But a slightly less mordant view might attribute this remark not to hegemony 
in its cruder form, but to the extraordinary distribution of an almost 
exclusively media-constructed vocabulary of identif icat ion and 
personalisation which may prove to be one of the more interesting cultural 
implications of globalisation. 
Disclosing the processes by which this vocabulary becomes 'globalised', 
and how these processes relate to other aspects of immediacy, should take 
us some way towards an understanding of the cultural agenda of 
globalisation. 
20. See Zygmunt 
Bauman, Liquid 
Modernity, 
Cambridge, Polity, 
2000. For more 
discussion, see my 
chapter, 'Culture, 
Modernity, 
Immediacy' in 
Ulrich Beck and R. 
Winter, Global 
America, Liverpool, 
University of 
Liverpool Press, 
2003. 
21. Paul Virilio, Open 
Sky, London, Verso, 
1997, p56. 
22. Siavoj Zizek, 
'Welcome to the 
Desert of the Real', 
available at <http:// 
alt.venus.co.uk/weed/ 
current/zizek.htm> 
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